Colombia: a bonanza for international investors?
Since 2011, CIVETS has stood out as the new buzz word circulating among financial operators and possibly as a form of dogma in the near future. In the jargon of financial markets, this term is nothing but the acronym of six developing countries 1 on which international investors should speculate, in search of high (and safe?) returns. fundamentals also create significant opportunities in the real estate (PMP, 2013, p. 12) .'
The increasing net inflow of capital observed in the Balance of Payment (figure 1, righthand side) would seem to confirm Colombia's bright future.
Figure 1 -Annual real GDP growth (left), Balance of Payments surplus (right). Source: DANE.
The above reports and recent analyses by the Colombian government 4 create the impression of a perfectly sound economy enjoying high and stable growth. In this paper, we argue that this apparent situation has a much broader aspect and such seemingly good performances hide more disturbing processes. On the one hand, past and prospected macroeconomic records have largely depended on -and indeed will continue to hinge upon -the increasing exploitation of Colombian natural resources, as well as high commodity prices on international markets. On the other hand, and perhaps more fundamentally, a dangerous process is currently unfolding within the Colombian economy, i.e. a dependence on foreign capital inflow to support a surprisingly high current account deficit. 5 We believe these facts may pose serious challenges to Colombian development in the near future.
International and domestic institutions have shared some of the above concerns.
OECD (2013), for instance, explicitly points out the relative, and at times absolute, contraction of the non-resource-based tradable good sector with respect to the energy and mining industry. In a working paper published by the Central Bank, Ojeda et al. (2014) elaborate on a DSGE model to assess the effects of a natural resource boom in the context of a three-sector small open economy. Both analyses share the description of structural (sectorial) changes in the Colombian economy, which follow the lines of a standard Dutch disease phenomenon. In a nutshell, the expansion of the energy sector and the ensuing foreign revenue windfall first raise domestic expenditures and lead to a real exchange rate appreciation. This, in turn, makes domestic manufacture less profitable and less attractive for investment, thus downsizing it. The two papers conclude with similar policy implications. For example, they advise for counter-cyclical fiscal policies in order to cut expenditures and soften real exchange rate appreciation.
The focus of this paper is different. We do not want to establish whether there is Dutch disease in Columbia or not. Rather, we claim that, on top of the long-run dynamics traditionally associated with a Dutch disease (i.e. de-industrialization, exchange rate appreciation etc.), Colombia is experimenting unsustainable medium to long run financial dynamics related to the Dutch disease impacts on the balance of payments. For this reason, we will concentrate our analysis on the dynamics observed in the balance of payments components, namely the trade balance, the net factor payments and the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows.
The astonishing expansion of the energy and mining industry in Colombia mostly relies on FDI targeting the sector. The object of this paper is to check whether such a boom might give rise to financial fragility (boom-and-bust cycles) and a deterioration of growth prospects. The fundamental mechanics of what we are suggesting are as follows. Mounting FDI inflow leads to net positive inflow of (foreign)
capital and, in a flexible exchange rate regime, to nominal (and real) appreciation of the domestic currency. At first, such an appreciation jeopardizes Colombian manufacture's competitiveness and exports, thus inducing considerable manufactured goods trade deficits and some de-industrialization. 6 On top of this, the exchange rate nominal appreciation attracts short-term portfolio investments, thus further appreciation, further de-industrialization and mounting foreign debt. Eventually, the repatriation of profits accruing to foreign investors in the energy sector (as well as the growing manufacturing trade deficit) leads to a deterioration in the current account such that the overall balance of payments may turn negative. The 'boom' turns into a 'bust' and, without central bank's interventions, the exchange rate depreciates. Such medium run cyclical dynamics may be detrimental to long-run growth because it is likely to reduce (both directly and indirectly) the share of manufacture in total GDP and manufacturing constitutes, à la Kaldor, the ultimate source of labor productivity growth and long-run development. Our purpose, and let us assert this point, is thus to establish whether this Colombian pattern of growth is macroeconomically viable and sustainable in the medium to long run.
Section 2 briefly outlines the abundant literature on Dutch disease, to make it clearer what we are (and what we are not) discussing. Section 3 provides evidence supporting the idea that Colombia is currently experiencing a de-industrialization process. Section 4 continues the analysis by observing some interesting macroeconomic features of the current Colombian pattern of growth. In particular, we look at changes in the sectorial destination of Foreign Direct Investments and at the decoupling in the dynamics of the current account and trade balance. Section 5 recapitulates our findings and describes briefly the risks associated with such a pattern. To emphasize these risks and make them more evident, we provide a scenario analysis, assessing the financial stability of the processes currently unfolding in the Colombian economy. We conclude discussing some policy options.
Dutch disease in a nutshell
Dutch disease is a well-known issue in the field of development economics. According to the original contribution by Corden and Neary (1982) , it refers to the structural consequences of a change in the sectorial composition of an economy, i.e. the relative and absolute reduction in the manufacturing sector's participation to GDP, due to a boom in the use of domestic natural resources. The traditional literature on this topic describes the Dutch disease as a real-side phenomenon, taking place through real-side mechanisms. In particular, a shock such as a sudden technological innovation in the energy sector, 7 the discovery of new natural resource endowments, and/or rising international prices of primary commodities, tends to raise domestic expenditures and alter domestic relative prices against the non-traditional tradable sector. Such a real exchange rate appreciation in turn reduces the viability and profitability of the manufacturing sector. In a general equilibrium framework, while both the energy and services sectors may expand, the manufacturing sector producing non-traditional tradable goods will shrink.
While it is worth studying such structural changes on their own, they are even more important if they entail consequences on the long-run growth potential of the economy. Indeed, several studies interpret the Dutch disease as the main source of a natural resource curse, i.e. the general disappointing economic performance of natural resource-rich countries compared to natural resource-poor economies (see Warner, 1995, 2001) . In this regard, the core point of the Dutch disease-natural resource curse nexus lies in the growth-enhancing properties generally attributed to manufacturing, with respect to the energy sector and services (see Warner, 1995 and Ros, 2001; Ha-Joon Chang, 2010) , so that the real wage, the profit rate and labor productivity growth may be simultaneously higher in a sufficiently large manufacturing-based economy with respect to countries specializing in nonmanufacturing and non-tradable sectors (Ros, 2001; Botta, 2010) .
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Regardless of the specific mechanisms at work and their theoretical or empirical character, all these analyses share the common aspect of being real side studies without a well-defined macroeconomic framework based on national accounting. In a way, they follow the original contribution of Corden and Neary (1982, p.825) by 'ignoring the monetary implications' of natural resource booms and the ensuing structural changes,
i.e. the effects such events may trigger on the external balance and financial solidity of the economies under observation. Warner (1995, 1999) , for instance, assume the current account of the balance of payments to be always in equilibrium thanks to natural resource 'manna' counterbalancing trade deficits arising from increased imports of tradable goods. Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega (1999) assume an exogenous trade surplus in order to meet interest payments on a given and constant stock of foreign debt.
When capital movements and financial transactions are considered (see Mansoorian, 1991) , they are formalized in a perfect foresight infinite horizon framework, in which international borrowing and accumulating foreign debt today are repaid through expanding manufacturing productions, increasing domestic savings and rising current account surpluses tomorrow. 9 Accordingly, in these models, boom-and-bust cycles linked to mounting foreign debts are ignored by assumption, even though they may represent relevant ways in which natural resource booms may influence long-run economic dynamics (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001 ).
Our contribution aims to fill this gap. In this sense, it draws illumination and insight from two previous works by Dutt (1997) and Taylor (2004) . Dutt (1997) emphasizes that incoming FDI may induce detrimental effects on the catching up process of developing economies, depending on the productive sector targeted by FDI.
Taylor (2004, chapter 12) describes the cyclical boom-and-bust dynamics, which are possibly set in motion by temporary capital inflows in developing economies. Our paper represents an attempt to put these two perspectives together in order to assess the macroeconomic instability and external vulnerability possibly originating from the FDIinduced Colombian Dutch disease. 
Structural Change and Sectorial dynamics in Colombia
Colombia has already gone through various episodes of de-industrialization. 11 On top of the current sharp decline in manufacturing sector' share in real value added, a similar trend also emerged from 1990 to 1999. The Colombian de-industrialization episode of the 1990s was most likely due to the radical switch in economic policy that Colombia went through during that period. The reform process, centered on trade liberalization, is deemed to have harshly hit Colombian industry, manufacturing in particular, which had been traditionally supported by a protectionist trade regime (Ocampo, 1994) . We use the standard Chow test to validate the structural break that seem to emerge from the data. The data set consists of 53 quarterly observations from 2001 Q1 to 2014 Q1. Unfortunately, due to a change in the methodology used by the Colombian statistical office (DANE), we cannot include previous data. Table 1 and Table 2 All the above-mentioned de-industrialization episodes are consistent with the worst de-industrialization case stressed by Tregenna (2011) . and low-skill sectors, with little scope for innovation and productivity growth, the latter are medium and high-skill technology-intensive sectors characterized by stronger (productivity) growth opportunities. 14 Overall, it seems that Colombian manufacturing is not only shrinking in relative and absolute terms, but it is concentrated in laborintensive low-skill industries. Hence, it might be a reasonable concern that the ongoing de-industrialization process might seriously impinge on Colombian long run development, provided that the non-traditional sophisticated tradable goods sectors still represent a fundamental source of labor productivity dynamics (Rodrik, 2007; Szirmai, 2012) . 
Real exchange rate dynamics, Foreign Direct Investments, and the

Colombian external account.
The macroeconomic dynamics briefly sketched in the first sections of this paper depend on a wide range of endogenous and exogenous factors of both long-and short-run 
The FDI-exchange rate nexus
Most economists would interpret the recent appreciation of the Colombian peso as the main factor curtailing the profitability and viability of Colombian manufacturing. Such an appreciation would in turn be attributed to a natural resource boom raising domestic expenditures and lifting inflation, in particular non-tradable sector inflation.
From 2003 to 2013, the Colombian real exchange rate has appreciated by 6.6%
yearly on average (see figure 3 ). 16 However, contrary to what might be expected, most of this trend comes from nominal appreciation, in the order of 6.4% yearly, rather than strong inflationary pressures. Data from international economic organizations confirm that Colombian inflation has been under control and has decreased remarkably since
Since 2003 Colombia has experienced the lowest inflation rates among CIVETS
countries. 17 Colombian inflation has often been lower than that registered in many of its most relevant trading partners, Latin American ones in particular. According to IMF (2014), it was below 3% in 2013 and it is expected to be around 1.9% in 2014. 2011. Yet, the Colombian current account has remained in deficit, and it has surprisingly worsened and diverged from an improving trade account. It is now in the order of more than 3% of GDP.
In order to understand why despite a growing current account deficit the Colombian peso revaluated so heavily over the last ten years until mid 2014, it is instructive to have a look to all the different components of the Colombian balance of payments. It is crucial to emphasize that the financial account surplus (i.e. an increasingly negative Colombian net international investment position) more than compensated for the current account deficit. In the period 2002-2013 the cumulated current account deficit amounted to US$ 67 billion, whereas the financial account surplus reached more than US$ 97 billion. These numbers seem to indicate that the origin of the Colombian Dutch disease is perhaps to be found in the macro sphere, in the financial one in particular.
In the case of Colombia, Foreign Direct Investment has shown some degree of volatility and instability due to exogenous economic factors (i.e. the worldwide 'Great Recession'), and their links to one-shot investment opportunities. SABMiller
Company's acquisition of the local beer brand Bavaria lies behind the erratic jump in Colombian growth opportunities and, say, exchange-rate induced capital gains, have then led to increasing net foreign short-term portfolio investment. In the light of the structural (sectorial) consequences of such macroeconomic trends and of the current account imbalances reported in next section, it would seem a straightforward progression to wonder whether such a self-feeding process may turn out to be unsustainable in the near future. 
Colombian trade and its current account
The Macroeconomics of the Financial Dutch Disease: a scenario analysis
According to the literature reviewed in section 2 and to the empirical evidence presented in sections 3 and 4, the picture we have described so far seems to suggest the existence of a strange sort of Dutch disease in Colombia. Its peculiar ingredients and the main mechanisms at work can be summarized in a few points. The data seems to indicate a change in FDI distribution from around 2001 onwards. We ran a Chow test to check for structural breaks and estimated the average shares for different samples. Both facts (the exchange rate revaluation and massive energy sector-oriented FDI) contribute to shift the Colombian productive structure away from manufacturing and to make it increasingly dependent on the exploitation of domestic natural resources. Second, huge profits repatriation by foreign investment in the Colombian oil sector emerges as the leading force behind Colombian current account imbalances.
Whilst these imbalances may easily turn out to be structural and permanent, we cannot say the same for the FDIs that have so far financed the existing external gap.
The kind of productive changes and external imbalances currently underway in
Colombia cast serious doubts on its long-run growth potential and financial stability.
Possible future scenarios
We have already emphasized our concern about a negative link between deindustrialization and productivity dynamics. This concern will be even stronger if we consider the current reduction in manufacturing participation to the GDP to be linked to a decreasing manufacturing labor productivity. Clearly, such facts are at odds with those historically observed in developed and successful East Asian 'catching-up' countries.
The relative concentration of Colombian manufacturing in labor-intensive low-skill productions may significantly downsize Colombia opportunities as to the accumulation of human capital and generation of innovation and technological spillovers on the rest of the economy. This is likely to weaken productivity dynamics and harm economic development. However, these dynamics, linked to a more traditional vision of the Dutch Disease are likely to develop at a rather slower pace since it involves a structural change of the composition of the economy which typically is measured in decades rather than years.
We are concerned about the dynamics unfolding in a much shorter time frame.
Persistent and large current account imbalances have often been perceived as destabilizing factors, potentially leading to exchange rate crises and financial turmoil in developing countries. Colombia is no exception and the data presented in section 4 leads one to ask whether the current Colombian development pattern is financially sustainable. In order to address this issue, we propose a scenario analysis 19 on the possible evolution of the various components of the Colombian Balance of Payments.
Our analysis relies on the data provided by the Colombian government in 2014 as to the expected long-run dynamics of oil prices (expected to remain close to 100 dollars per barrel since 2014 on), oil production and exports, GDP and imports growth rates (Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, 2014a). 20 Further, the Colombian government also published its expectations as for current account dynamics, net capital inflows and variation in foreign reserves. We do not have available additional information concerning net factor payments, profit repatriation in particular, and non-oil exports. 
Current account dynamics
In the left-hand side of figure 8, we show the current dynamics of Colombian net factor payments. Consistently with figure 6, it has become astonishingly negative in the last decade mainly due to an enormous increase in FDI' profit repatriation. We assume three possible scenarios as to future net factor payments evolution. First, we assume it maintains a constant nominal value, equal to its 2013 level, throughout the next ten years (dashed line). Second, we assume NFP to move at the same pace as the Colombian nominal GDP, i.e. the NFP/GDP ratio is constant (dotted line). Finally, we project possible increases in NFP Colombian outflows using an HP-filter trend (dasheddotted line). On the right-hand side of figure 8, we plot the required increase in
Colombian non-oil export in order to meet government's current account expectations, following equation (1), where CA is the current account, X Oil and X NonOil are exports of Oil and Non-Oil respectively, M is imports and NFP is net factor payments.
As shown by equation (1) show the implications of the aforementioned scenarios on NFP dynamics in order to meet the government current account target. What emerges is that NFP will remain reasonably negative for some years ahead. Nonetheless from 2020 onwards, the increasing gap between total imports and oil exports, and the ensuing widening overall trade deficit (in goods and services), together with an expected reduction in the current account deficit, implies that NFP will switch from negative to positive values. Needless to say, such a scenario appears at the very least unrealistic. This is even more so if it is linked to the government's expectations regarding persistently positive net FDI over the next ten years. Indeed, in presence of persistently positive net FDI inflows, and of an increasing stock of foreign direct investment in Colombia, it seems reasonable to expect a further rise in the flow of profits repatriation and, hence, an even more negative NFP.
In the end, there are no credible reasons this could turn into positive in a foreseeable future. Figures 8 and 9 describe 'implicit' dynamics in non-oil Colombian exports or, alternatively, in NFP consistent with governmental targets on the overall current account balance. Let us now modify our perspective and assume that the Colombian current account is endogenous and determined by the prevailing trends in their several components. According to the different scenarios we assume, the Colombian current account may actually assume values quite separate from government expectations.
Financial Account and Current account reconciliation
Given the doubts shed on the government-forecasted value of the current account, we pursue our analysis by computing our own forecasts for the current account. We follow equation (1) Should the government's expectation be confirmed, decreasing net positive capital inflows (as a ratio of GDP) would be more than enough to match the current account deficit and ensure stable Colombian foreign reserves (small dashed line). In the last decade, Colombia has experienced a remarkable surge in net capital inflows. Things change radically if we assume that the Colombian current account will be the result of non-oil exports and net factor payments moving on a par with GDP (dash-dotted line)
or, even worse, following past HP trends (long dash line). In both scenarios, Colombia would need constantly growing and indeed mounting financial account surpluses (i.e. an increasingly negative net international investment position) in order to cover the huge current account imbalances. 
Foreign reserves dynamics
The last exercise we ran is to determine the impact of the various scenarios at hand on the accumulation of foreign reserves, assuming a constant exchange rate. We assume two trends for each account of the balance of payment accounts, thus implying four different scenarios, on top of the governmental forecasts. . 21 In such a scenario, Colombian foreign reserves will be driven close to zero by the end of 2019. 
Policy Options
What are the policy implications of these scenarios and expected dynamics in Colombian foreign reserves? In the last decade, the Colombian economy has become far more dependent on the exploitation and exports of its own natural resources in order to pay for increasing imports of capital goods. The exports of oil and related products represent (in 2012) much more than 50% of Colombian exports. According to data provided by DANE (2014) , by the end of 2012, foreign imports represent more than 60% of the total supply (domestic production plus imports) of capital goods. This ratio was less than 47% in 2000. Such a deep structural change in the Colombian economy implies that the nominal exchange rate appreciation is a fundamental macroeconomic variable affecting Colombian capability to invest, accumulate capital stock and support economic growth. A depreciation of the exchange rate, by making imported capital goods more expensive, could easily curtail investments and growth. In order to avoid such an event taking place, available foreign reserves play a fundamental role -they are the weapon in the hands of the Central Bank to defend the domestic currency. A shortage of foreign reserves might start a financial crisis.
Our analysis shows that there is no risk of such events taking place in the near future in Colombia. The right-hand side of figure 8, for instance, reveals that slightly increasing non-oil exports, as a share of GDP, will be enough to compensate for negative NFP and guarantee the Colombian current account to reach the government's target in the next 2-3 years. Similarly, negative NFP do not need to be immediately reduced in order to ensure an easy management of the Colombian external account and the Colombian peso. Yet, our analysis also shows that some trends characterizing Colombia since the mid 2000s are unsustainable in the medium to long run. Should huge profit repatriation continue in the upcoming years according to the astonishing dynamics registered so far, net positive capital inflows will not suffice, even in the best possible scenario, to preserve Colombian foreign reserves or to avoid a possible exchange rate crisis. 22 Furthermore, government optimistic forecasts rely upon a type of 'financial account-current account counter-balancing' mechanism that might be suitable in terms of addressing short-term problems, but is likely to give rise to viciously unstable dynamics in the long run. In the end, this may turn out to be the main source of Colombia possible financial instability. According to Singh, FDI investment creates foreign exchange liabilities not only now but also into the future. This characteristic leads to the danger that unfettered FDI may create a time profile of foreign exchange outflows (in the form of dividends payments or profit repatriation) and inflows (i.e. fresh FDI) which may be time inconsistent (Singh, 2003, p. 209) .
Thus, important current foreign capital inflows, FDI in particular, provide the country with foreign currency flows covering current account deficits and, possibly, stabilizing the exchange rate (or creating room for an exchange rate stabilization). However, they also create the basis for even higher foreign currency outlays in the upcoming years, hence the need for even stronger financial account inflow. The beneficial impact of FDI has a weak basis and may easily break down. Should capital inflow decrease due to a reduction in natural resource sector's profitability, for example, the fundamental source of foreign currency inflow will dry up while the foreign currency outflow still exists. This is the kind of risk Singh puts forward and which Colombia may face in the medium/long-run.
Interestingly, recent economic facts reinforce our doubts as to the medium-tolong run "structural" solidity of the Colombian external account, and the Colombian capability to manage and stabilize the exchange rate. We refer to the huge drop in the In order to be able to tackle such possible undesirable outcomes in advance and in a more structural way, two additional policy measures come to mind. They are strictly linked to each other. First, Colombia should reduce its dependence on foreign direct investment as both a source of foreign currency inflow and productive investment. To clarify this point, this does not imply that Colombia should discourage FDI from taking place, in particular those which may lead to a diversification of its productive and export pattern. We are simply suggesting that FDI should represent only part, and perhaps not the most relevant one, of Colombian capital accumulation and development processes, together with productive initiatives undertaken by domestic participants. Second, and in accordance with the previous point, the Colombian government should implement policies that significantly diversify the export base. The Colombian government foresees a reduction in the production of oil since 2017 onwards. There is no guarantee that the dynamics of non-oil exports (including other primary commodities) will be sustainable enough to avoid a widening current account deficit from taking place, nor to pay for increased repatriation of foreign companies' profits. The expansion of Colombian product and export space may provide the required dynamics. In the end, such a strategy would be absolutely in line with the most recent evidence on successful episodes of long-run economic development. It is the kind of goods exported that matters for growth (Haussmann et al. 2007) , and product diversification characterizes a relevant part of the development process (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Rodrik, 2007) . This is even more relevant to the present case since, according to Hernandez Jimenez and Razmi (2014) , Colombia is among those Latin American economies in which an improvement in the trade account, perhaps via export diversification, provides a fundamental spur to economic growth. Apparently Colombia has followed a radically different development pattern from that outlined above, which has put too much emphasis on the exploitation of domestic natural resources as its main source of economic growth (the so called 'locomotora minera-energetica').
It might be wise for Colombia to use natural resource revenues to support a clear diversification strategy that might, at least partially, rebalance the development strategy it has followed so far. "Product and export diversification" means, inevitably, industrial policy. Which kind of industrial policy? There are essentially two issues at stake. First, the articulation between trade and industrial policy. Second, the "horizontal" vs.
"vertical' orientation of the same industrial policy. Talking about the first issue means understanding a big mistake made by Colombian policy-makers in terms of the appropriate sequencing of the policy-mix. What we have learnt from the extraordinary development experiences of several Asian economies is that a good formula to promote product and export diversification is "trade liberalization cum export promotion and vertical industrial policy based on the scheme privilege-incentive-threat" (e.g.: a sector is protected only for a limited and pre-established period of time and provided that some performance criteria are respected -say, x percent of your production is to be exported after 3 years of protection, otherwise protection is withdrawn). Colombian policy-mix, on the contrary, has been based on the formula "trade liberalisation cum progressively weaker export promotion and horizontal industrial policy without incentives and threats". As to trade liberalization, this is, in Colombia, a fact of life: over the last [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] five years the country has signed so many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), including with richer and larger partners (European Union and United States). As to the progressively weaker export promotion, here it suffices to remind that starting from 1967 (when the agency ProExpo was created), the average, implicit export subsidy has been continuously falling (Missaglia, 2014 American countries should invest 4-6% of GDP in infrastructure in order to catch up with fast growing Asian economies 24 , but it is certainly not enough to invest less than 1% for two decades (Missaglia, 2014) . Colombia (Goda and Torres, 2013, p. 16) '. On the other hand, they find that real exchange rate appreciation explains most of the de-industrialization episode currently underway in Colombia.
7. Corden and Neary (1982) assume a Hicks-neutral technological progress to take place in the energy sector, raising both labor and capital productivity in that sector.
Similar results could also be obtained if an increase of primary commodities' prices is assumed and the country under consideration is a net exporter of primary energy commodities, or if there is an increase in the endowment of the natural resource input specific to the energy sector.
8. Torvik (2001) allows for different results by allowing for learning-by-doing to take place in the non-tradable sector as well, and technological spill-over running both ways (from manufacturing to services and vice versa).
9. Different conclusions with respect to the standard 'Dutch disease' literature can be obtained when inter-temporal optimization and consumption smoothing is allowed through financial market mechanisms. Mansoorian (1991) , for instance, finds that a real depreciation and an expanding manufacturing sector could emerge in the long run as the optimal response to over-borrowing, real exchange rate appreciation and de-industrialization in the short run. These conclusions reinforce those provided by will not consume all current oil revenues, but will rather save in anticipation of the future decline […] to the extent that the current revenues overstate the 'perpetuity equivalent' of oil earnings, a focus on current production levels overstates the resource allocation consequences of the oil sector (Bruno and Sachs,1982, p. 858) .'
10. Considering the interplay between financial and real factors in the analysis of Dutch disease is not completely new. See, for instance, Blecker and Seccareccia (2008) .
11. The debate on Colombian deindustrialization dates back to at least 1986, see Kamas (1986) .
12. Tregenna (2011) identifies three possible processes leading to de-industrialization as measured by a reduction of the manufacturing employment share. First, a reduction in labor-intensity (increase in labor productivity) coupled with a contraction of that sector output; second, a reduction in labor-intensity that outweighs the expansion of sector production; finally, the contraction of sectorial activity that outweighs the increase in labor-intensity (decline in labor productivity). Such processes, all giving rise to a lower manufacturing employment share, are likely to prompt different and perhaps opposite effects on overall economic records. This is also the reason why analogous trends in manufacturing employment in Asian and Latin American economies, Colombia among them, have been often associated to diverging economic performances. Whilst the former registered increasing manufacturing value added shares and even stronger improvements in manufacturing labor productivity, most Latin American economies experienced worrisome premature reductions in manufacturing GDP shares, and dismal increases in labor productivity by international standards. Indeed, 'if a decrease in manufacturing employment share is primarily accounted for by falling labor-intensity of manufacturing, this calls into question the extent to which 'de-industrialization' is an appropriate characterization. The point is that a fall in the share of manufacturing employment that is mostly accounted for by falling labor intensity (i.e. increasing labor productivity) would not necessary have a negative impact on growth. This is different from the case where the fall in the share of manufacturing employment is associated primarily with a decline of the manufacturing sector as a share of GDP.
In such a scenario, an economy would be particularly at risk of losing out on the growth-pulling effects of manufacturing (Tregenna, 2011, p.15) .'
